Section 1.7. Statutory Construction Act of 1972 applicable

Section 1502(a)(2) of 1 Pa.C.S. (relating to application of part) provides that, except as otherwise provided by statute or the agency adopting the document, 1 Pa.C.S. Part V (relating to Statutory Construction Act of 1972) applies to a document codified in the Code except legislative, judicial and home rule charter documents, that is, except documents codified in 101 Pa. Code—365 Pa. Code.

The provision of this § 1.7 amended through June 14, 1974, 4 Pa.B. 1209. Immediately preceding text appears at serial page (0756).

Notation

Notes of Decisions

Constitutionality

A statute may be found unconstitutionally vague if it lacks definiteness or adequacy of statutory expression. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 911 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Party challenging statute’s constitutionality bears a very heavy burden to prove that it is unconstitutional, and all doubts on the question are resolved in favor of a finding of constitutionality. Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 212 (Pa. 2007).

Construction

If two readings of a statute are reasonable, greater deference must be given to the interpretation of the administrative agency responsible for its enforcement. Seneca Landfill v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Protection, 984 A.2d 916, 925 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), quoting Bethenergy Mines Inc. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Protection, 676 A.2d 711 (Pa. Cmwlth.) petition for allowance of appeal denied, 685 A.2d 547 (1996).

Words and phrases in a statute must be construed according to rules of grammar and their common and approved usage; this rule applies as well in interpreting undefined terms in administrative regulations, citing to Martin Media v. Dept. of Transportation, 641 A.2d 630 (1994); Velazquez v. East Stroudsburg, 949 A.2d 354, 358-359 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

The Court must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its rules and regulations unless the interpretation is unreasonable or the interpretation frustrates the legislative purpose. Goslin v. State Board of Medicine, 937 A.2d 531, 535 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

Preambles may be used to resolve an ambiguity in a regulation; however, preambles may not be used to create ambiguity where none exists, and in any case where a preamble is used as a tool to resolve an ambiguous law, the preamble is not controlling. The language in the preamble was not controlling because the regulatory language was clear. UMCO v. Department of Environmental Protection, 938 A.2d 530, 537 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

In interpreting an administrative regulation, as in interpreting a statute, the plain language of the regulation is paramount. Schappel v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Company, 934 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Pa. 2007).

It is well settled that an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute is given controlling weight unless it is clearly erroneous. Riverwalk Casino v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, 926 A.2d 926, 940 (Pa. 2007).

Purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the general assembly. Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 962 (Pa. 2007).

Where a term is continued to be used in an amendment to a regulation or statute, the presumption is that the term carries the same meaning as before. St. Ignatius v. Department of Public Welfare, 918 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

In ascertaining the common and approved usage of a word the court may resort to a dictionary. St. Ignatius Department of Public Welfare, 918 A.2d 838, 845 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

Generally, courts defer to an administering agency’s interpretations of its own regulations. Pinto v. State Civil Service Commission, 912 A.2d 787, 794 (Pa. 2006).

Administrative interpretations of a statute are entitled to some deference, particularly where a statute is technical or complex, but such deference will exist only where the reviewing court is satisfied that the regulation tracks the meaning of the statute and does not violate the intent of the legislation. Commonwealth v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., 822 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), order aff’d, 384 A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2003).

For purposes of constitutional challenges based on vagueness, regulations are treated as statutes. Tri-County Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 818 A.2d. 574 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003); appeal granted 835 A.2d 706 (Pa. 2003); decision affirmed Eagle Erwin II, L.P.V. Com. 884 A.2d 867 (Pa. 2005). The degree of vageness that is constitutionally tolerable depends in part on the nature of the enactment. Id. at 583.

The provision at 1 Pa.C.S. § 1926, providing that no statute may be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly, is equally applicable to Horse Racing Commission’s regulations. Bush v. Horse Racing Commission, 466 A.2d 254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983).

Statutory construction rules apply equally to the interpretation of administrative regulations, citing Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor and Indus., 958 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. DEP, 979 A.2d 931, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

Doctrine of Preemption

Under the doctrine of preemption, a municipality may not exercise power or authority in violation of the preemption doctrine, which provides that when the legislature has preempted a field the State has retained all regulatory and legislative power for itself and therefore prohibits local legislation in that area. Michell’s Bar & Restaurant v. Allegheny County, 924 A.2d 730, 736-737 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

General

The principles of statutory construction apply to regulatory provisions as well as statutory provisions. Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement v. Benny Enterprises, Inc., 669 A.2d 1018, 1021 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), appeal denied 681 A.2d 1344 (Pa. 1996).

The rules of statutory construction apply to regulations as well as statutes. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 590 A.2d 384, 397 (1991).

Regulation

Depending on what type it is, an administrative regulation may be either binding (legislative) or merely entitled to deference (interpretive). Generally, a legistative regulation establishes a substantive rule creating a controlling standard of conduct. An interpretive regulation merely construes and does not expand upon the terms of a statute. Slippery Rock Area v. Unemployment Comp., 983 A.2d 1231, 1236 (Pa. 2009).

Statutory Construction

The rules of statutory construction apply to regulations. Bayada Nurses v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Labor, 958 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

When an agency adopts a regulation under its delegated legislative power, it is valid and as binding as a statute so long as it is adopted within the agency’s granted power, issued pursuant to proper procedure and is reasonable, citing Tire Jockey Serv., Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 915 A.2d 1165 (2007). Bayada Nurses v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Labor 958 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

Agencies’ adoption of substantive regulations result from legislative power granted by the legislature and establish new law, rights or duties that enjoy a general presumption of reasonableness; interpretative regulations construe a statute and do not expand upon its terms, and courts defer to agency interpretations so long as they are reasonable and genuinely tract the meaning of the underlying statute, citing Rohrbaugh v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 727 A.2d 1088 (1999). Bayada Nurses v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Labor, 958 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).